Dr Lippert investigates the impact of side-payments to countries that have a low net benefit from participating in efficient climate cooperation in a repeated game framework with investment in green compliance technology. He considers different timings of these payments, and different degrees of commitment.
If high-benefit countries cannot commit ex ante to transfer funds to low-benefit participants to an agreement, then there is a trade-off. Investment based agreements, where transfers occur before emissions are realized, but after investments have been committed, maximize the scope of cooperation.
Results-based agreements minimize transfers whenever these agreements implement cooperation. If countries can commit to transfer funds, then agreements in which countries with high benefits of climate cooperation pre-commit to results-based payments to countries with low benefits both maximize the scope of cooperation and minimize transfers.
About the presenter
Dr Steffen Lippert joined the Department of Economics as a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland in July 2014. Prior to this, he was a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Otago and at Massey University and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics in Stockholm. He studied Economics at Mannheim, Berkeley, and Toulouse and received his PhD in Economics in 2005 jointly from the Toulouse School of Economics and Mannheim University. His research focuses on Industrial Economics, the Economics of Innovation, the Economics of Social Interaction and Networks, and recently the Economics of Climate Cooperation.